This paper investigates the macroeconomic and welfare effects of an anticipated future switch from destination-to origin-based commodity taxation. We set up an intertemporal representative-agent model of an open economy and study especially consumption, investment, and trade-balance responses to the commodity-tax reform. The anticipation effects on the macroeconomy are significant, whereas their welfare implications are not.
Introduction
Continuing regional integration in the European Union, but also in North America, has reopened the debate on the proper scheme of taxing international commodity trade. The basic problem is that not all final consumers will be taxed under the current destination principle, when borders are open. Those consumers that cross borders and undertake their purchases abroad pay the value-added tax (VAT) of the respective foreign country rather than the VAT of their country of residence. Hence maintaining the destination principle for producer trade while taxation of part of direct consumer purchases breaks with this principle leads to a hybrid international commodity-tax scheme, which distorts the trade pattern in the union. Furthermore, the scheme offers incentives for integrating countries to engage in a mutually harmful process of commodity-tax competition in order to attract cross-border shopping and other forms of direct consumer purchases (e.g., Sinn, 1990) . These effects may be aggravated further when the transaction costs for tax arbitrage in the form of cross-border shopping are reduced in the European monetary union. The potentially serious drawbacks of the current regime have led to a revival of interest in the alternative of taxing all commodity trade under the origin principle.
The issue is, of course, not a new one. A fundamental equivalence between the origin and the destination principle dates back to the Tinbergen Report (Europ~iische Gemeinschaft fiir Kohle und Stahl Hohe Beh6rde, 1953) , and the conclusion that only the origin principle of commodity taxation is compatible with a true internal market can already be found in the report of the Neumark Committee (European Communities Commission, 1963) . These reports are, however, based on the assumption that there is no international factor mobility. Recently, several authors have reconsidered the equivalence of origin-and destination-based commodity taxation in a setting with perfect international capital mobility (Krause-Junk, 1992; Bovenberg, 1994; Genser et al., 1995) . A common result of these analyses is that a switch to the origin principle reduces the return to "old" capital, but it does not distort investment decisions and causes no global efficiency losses, if the tax is levied at a uniform rate on all goods. This result puts the origin principle in a rather favorable light and has caused several authors to recommend a switch to this commodity-tax scheme for the European Union. 1
Dynamic analyses of the switch to origin-based commodity taxation have generally assumed that this switch is unexpected. 2 Bovenberg (1994), for example, provides a comprehensive account of the dynamic effects of an unanticipated switch to an origin-based commodity tax, allowing for both overlapping generations and foreign ownership of domestic equity. In such a setting, the tax switch generates macroeconomic consequences through intergenerafional distribution and via a shift of the tax burden to foreigners. In practice, however, it can be virtually excluded that a major tax reform that requires the unanimous consent of all EU member states can be devised so as to surprise capital 1 Another recent argument in favor of the origin principle is that it can be combined with the destination principle for trade with third countries in a nondistorfive way (Lockwood et al., 1994) . Also, Genser and Schulze (1995) counter the argument that the origin principle -unlike the destination principle -is vulnerable to transfer-pricing activity between entities of multinational companies. They argue instead that origin taxation of commodities may actually reduce the incentives for transfer pricing when corporate taxation is included in the analysis and there is a negative relationship between valueadded and corporate tax rates.
2 One exception is the computable general-equilibrium analysis of Fehr (1996), of which we became aware in the process of writing this paper. Fehr focuses on the intergenerafional and international welfare effects of a switch in the commodity-tax principle and numerically compares these effects in the absence and in the presence of a policy pre-announcement.
